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ABSTRACT 
At present, CubeSat components and buses are generally not appropriate for missions where significant risk of 
failure, or the inability to quantify risk or confidence, is acceptable.  However, in the future we anticipate that 
CubeSats will be used for missions requiring reliability of 1-3 years for Earth-observing missions and even longer 
for Planetary, Heliophysics, and Astrophysics missions.  Their growing potential utility is driving an interagency 
effort to improve and quantify CubeSat reliability, and more generally, small satellite mission risk.  The Small 
Satellite Reliability Initiative (SSRI)—an ongoing activity with broad collaborative participation from civil, DoD, 
and commercial space systems providers and stakeholders—targets this challenge.  The Initiative seeks to define 
implementable and broadly-accepted approaches to achieve reliability and acceptable risk postures associated with 
several SmallSat mission risk classes—from “do no harm” missions, to those associated with missions whose failure 
would result in loss or delay of key national objectives.  These approaches will maintain, to the extent practical, cost 
efficiencies associated with small satellite missions and consider constraints associated with supply chain elements, 
as appropriate. 
The SSRI addresses this challenge from two architectural levels—the mission- or system-level, and the component- 
or subsystem-level.  The mission- or system-level scope targets assessment approaches that are efficient and 
effective, with mitigation strategies that facilitate resiliency to mission or system anomalies while the component- or 
subsystem-level scope addresses the challenge at lower architectural levels.  The initiative does not limit strategies 
and approaches to proven and traditional methodologies, but is focused on fomenting thought on novel and 
innovative solutions. 
This paper discusses the genesis of and drivers for this initiative, how the public-private collaboration is being 
executed, findings and recommendations derived to date, and next steps towards broadening small satellite mission 
potential. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20180002864 2019-08-29T18:08:44+00:00Z
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MOTIVATION 
At present, CubeSat components and buses are 
generally not appropriate for missions where significant 
risk of failure, or the inability to quantify risk or 
confidence, is acceptable.  However, in the future we 
anticipate that CubeSats will be used for missions 
requiring reliability of 1-3 years for Earth missions and 
even longer for Planetary, Heliophysics, and 
Astrophysics missions.  In addition, SmallSats could be 
developed using CubeSat components and subsystems 
but will not have the CubeSat form factor.  Both 
CubeSats and SmallSats could then be used where their 
attributes enable or enhance mission objectives or 
provide other meaningful benefits—e.g. lower cost, 
increased coverage (spatial, temporal, spectral), agility, 
resiliency, etc.   
Accordingly, the following discussion is not relevant 
only to CubeSats but also applies to small spacecraft 
that could benefit from CubeSat-derived systems, 
components, and development processes. 
CUBESAT/SMALLSAT BENEFITS AND 
MISSION POTENTIAL 
Over the last two decades, the advancements in 
microelectronics have allowed satellite developers to 
engineer ever greater capability into shrinking sizes, 
enabling more in-space capability for lower launch 
costs. We define Small Spacecraft (SmallSats) as 
spacecraft, enabled by ready access to space, that 
achieve meaningful missions and whose cost and 
schedule is not hampered by mission assurance 
practices, process, and architectures typical of billion 
dollar missions.  Such spacecraft developments are 
enhanced by drastically scalable mission assurance 
enabled by new practices, process, and architectures 
that yield cost and schedule efficiencies. CubeSats, a 
type of small satellite comprising units measuring 10 
cm x10 cm x10 cm and generally weighing less than 
1kg, were first developed at Cal Poly and Stanford in 
the late 1990’s as training tools for aerospace 
engineering students. Using commercial-off-the-shelf 
(COTS) parts, and mainly operating only in low earth 
orbit, these satellites were developed as short-term, 
high-risk experiments for educational purposes that fit 
into university budgets. However, the affordability and 
short development times of CubeSats were attractive to 
many in industry and government. This platform is now 
increasingly being considered for operational missions, 
for commercial use, for national security, and for 
advancing space science.  
Many government organizations are considering using 
CubeSats to achieve mission objectives that otherwise 
would have been too expensive or not achievable. In 
particular, the following NASA applications are 
envisioned: 
•    For planetary missions, most applications consider 
one or more CubeSats to ride along the main spacecraft 
to augment the science return.  CubeSats use the main 
spacecraft as a ‘mothership’ and are deployed for 
proximity operations or landers when this role is too 
risky or impractical for the main 
spacecraft. CubeSats/SmallSats are also envisioned to 
perform spatially- and temporally-distributed 
measurements through swarms or organized 
constellations. Using CubeSats in 
intentionally sacrificial missions, such as impactors, are 
another niche application under consideration 
for planetary bodies. 
•    In heliophysics, it has been said that “Most of the 
important phenomena involve simultaneous variations 
in space and time. In some cases, simultaneous 
measurements made at two well-chosen locations will 
provide unambiguous results. In other cases, it may be 
necessary to make simultaneous measurements at 
several hundred locations.” CubeSats are an opportunity 
to more efficiently implement what had been done by 
large traditional spacecraft, through deploying many 
CubeSats in swarms or ordered constellations. 
•   Small astrophysics spacecraft can serve as 
pathfinders or calibration missions for flagship or probe 
missions.  They can also comprise nodes in sensor 
networks that continuously monitor stars in deep space 
to detect and characterize exoplanets. 
•    For Earth-observing missions, development of 
complex, scientifically-valid instruments that fit the 
CubeSat form factor has grown exponentially over the 
last few years, covering almost all frequency bands 
within the electromagnetic band for a wide range of 
applications. The mission opportunities for LEO 
CubeSats/SmallSats are now being considered for many 
applications including monitoring storm evolution, 
capturing high spatial resolution mesoscale structures 
and phenomena that require large constellations that are 
not cost-effective to implement with traditional 
spacecraft. 
While these applications target NASA-type missions 
there are other governmental agencies who also 
envision mission concepts impacted by these lower cost 
missions. In addition, SmallSats often serve as 
pathfinders for larger spaceflight missions, retiring the 
risk associated with flight systems and components that 
are later infused into these missions. 
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CUBESAT-SMALLSAT DEFICIENCIES 
Reliability issues raise significant concerns when using 
CubeSats/SmallSats as operational systems. A 
comprehensive database of missions shows that more 
than 40 percent of CubeSats launched since 2000 failed 
to accomplish their objectives. While many of these 
systems were educational experiments or commercial 
prototypes, the overall market has been skeptical about 
whether CubeSats/SmallSats can be used reliably to 
accomplish critical operations, such as national security 
missions or deep space programs.  The challenge for 
many developers is engineering a system consistent 
with targeted mission confidence levels while 
maintaining the reduced cost/schedule advantages 
associated with these platforms. 
In the space community, we establish confidence in the 
development of any new space system based on 
decades of lessons learned, proven designs, established 
reliability histories of parts and components, 
involvement of experienced individuals, and through 
the use of cost/schedule margins in the development 
process to account for changing elements or unforeseen 
issues.  In general, building spacecraft systems has 
benefited from significant resources used to cover 
development costs including numerous barriers of 
protection for safety and mission success, as well as 
sizable mass and volume on a launch vehicle to bring 
spacecraft into orbit.  The advent of the CubeSat has 
provided the opportunity to change the paradigm 
created over many years when spacecraft have become 
ever larger and more complex.   
The small size of the CubeSat has enabled multiple 
organizations, e.g., educational institutions at all levels, 
to produce complete CubeSats. This has led to new 
industries arising, opening the door to organizations 
that do not necessarily have the experience base to 
produce reliable spacecraft. In addition, time, money, 
and volumetric resources are not available with the 
same margins available to larger spacecraft.  These 
aspects come together to drive a set of constraints on 
CubeSats that do not apply to larger spacecraft 
developments.  For example, the use of most military 
specification (MIL-SPEC) parts, or parts screened to 
the MIL-SPEC levels, frequently are overly expensive, 
require too much time for delivery, and do not fit the 
profiles of the circuit card assemblies in CubeSat form 
factors.  The components and assemblies that have been 
proven with widespread flight heritage in larger 
spacecraft, such as star trackers, inertial measurement 
units, reaction wheel assemblies, transceivers, etc. are 
well beyond the mass, volume, power, and cost 
constraints of a CubeSat/SmallSat.  Hence, many 
components and subsystems are starting out without 
any reliability basis.   
Fortunately, over the past decade, the international 
electronics industry has boomed, although the CubeSat 
community has yet to come to grips with how to take 
advantage of it.  Furthermore, it has not yet been fully 
recognized that some of the conveniences built-in for 
larger spacecraft may not be appropriate for an 
excessively size-constrained application.  For example, 
connectors have long been a means to trade space for 
modularity.  However, even the small amounts of space 
required for connectors may be too much for the 
constraints of CubeSats.  Past experiences on larger, 
low-risk missions have produced many lessons-learned 
on the integrity of connectors that steer many 
developers away from the few types of connectors that 
may be appropriate for a CubeSat.  In many instances, 
wireless or other smart cabling approaches should be 
strongly considered where they may be appropriate; but 
this may require different analyses for electromagnetic 
interference.   
The establishment of a CubeSat supply chain to 
produce parts and components helpful to broad CubeSat 
applications is in its infancy, as it is common to see 
very late deliveries and numerous products not 
functioning as specified, including many dead-on- 
arrival. Often the update cycle for electronic 
components is so rapid that establishing heritage is 
hardly even possible. 
A major advantage offered by CubeSats/SmallSats in 
certain mission architectures is the ability to spread 
technical risk across multiple small satellites in a 
constellation. When a mission comprises multiple 
CubeSats, as opposed to a single high-reliability asset, 
the evaluation of success changes—the question 
becomes whether the constellation achieves its mission, 
not whether all parts of the system perform flawlessly. 
This represents a revolutionary change in the approach 
to system engineering for space systems, from 
traditional high-reliability large satellites designed to 
last for decades, to a “disposable” mentality where 
smaller satellites are engineered to perform a certain 
function for a short time, to address, in many cases, 
changing market needs.  
More specifically, risk calculations for CubeSats 
systems need to take into account statistical reliability 
(i.e. some or most systems work well enough to achieve 
the mission, even though there are failures on some of 
the satellites) to determine how much risk a mission can 
tolerate, and then design to that risk. Therefore, the 
engineering development focuses on system resiliency 
to problems, and designing around failure modes, rather 
than trying to eliminate failures altogether. The system 
engineering requirements also vary depending on the 
requirements of the mission and how much risk that 
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mission can accept. For this reason, detailed best 
practices cannot be established for the CubeSat or 
SmallSat market as a whole, but only to the risk 
category each system is assigned based on its mission.   
THE RELIABILITY INITIATIVE 
The growing potential utility of CubeSats/SmallSats is 
driving an interagency effort to improve and quantify 
reliability, and more generally, small satellite mission 
risk. The initiative began with a conversation between 
engineers at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center 
(GSFC) and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) on the 
need for small satellite technology appropriate for 
missions with high confidence expectations.  Although 
systems and processes applied to large spacecraft could 
be applied to small platforms to achieve this outcome, 
such an approach would likely compromise 
characteristics associated with SmallSat-based 
missions—innovation, agility, and low cost relative to 
large.  Accordingly, new approaches to address this 
challenge would be needed.  
These discussions expanded to a team comprising 
interested persons from other government or 
government-like organizations.  From this team was 
formed a sub-team of individuals with diverse and 
skilled perspectives.  They realized government 
imposition could not derive solutions to this challenge, 
but instead, significant advancements could result from 
a collaborative public-private partnership engagement 
that exchanged needs, perspectives, expertise, and 
constraints.  
Initial Recommended Approaches to Framing 
Solutions  
A team with representatives from government and 
government-funded organizations was formed and 
tasked to address the following charge: 
Recommend approaches to achieve reliability/risk 
tolerance associated with each mission risk class. 
Define and leverage novel component, subsystem, 
spacecraft, and mission-level risk mitigation strategies 
that maintain, to the extent practical, cost efficiencies 
associated with small satellite missions.  Consider 
constraints associated with supply chain elements, as 
appropriate. 
Team members worked on recommendations to address 
the charter in preparation for a Technology Interchange 
Meeting (TIM). The TIM was held at the California 
Institute of Technology on February 14th and 15th, 2017. 
The objective of the TIM was to reach agreement on a 
common language to help set expectations for CubeSat-
SmallSat missions and expectations on the level of 
mission assurance for each classification. During the 
TIM, the subcommittee presented its findings and 
recommendations to date and solicited feedback and 
recommendations from attendees through splinter 
sessions and focused topic presentations. The TIM 
attendees included representatives from civil, DoD, 
academic, and commercial CubeSat providers and 
stakeholders. 
Initial Recommendations 
The initial recommendation defined risk levels and 
created a standard SmallSat/CubeSat risk classification 
nomenclature. The resulting nomenclature was similar 
to the NASA risk classification nomenclature. The 
subcommittee proposed activities required from the 
disciplines for each risk posture category, Alpha 
through Delta. The draft recommendations were 
formulated with the understanding that they were subject 
to change per recommendations made at the TIM. 
TIM Findings 
The TIM was structured in a way to promote thinking 
beyond proven and traditional methodologies. The group 
was tasked with identifying transformational solutions 
enabling the traditionally risk-adverse space community 
to adopt a new paradigm of space hardware engineering. 
The two-day event featured presentations of CubeSat 
science and operational mission drivers from various 
government organizations, select industry topic 
presentations including lessons learned, and presentations 
from the subcommittee regarding its findings and 
recommendations. 
The mission assurance discussions were split into two 
categories. These categories were mission/system level 
assurance approaches and subsystem/component level 
assurance approaches. There were also presentations and 
discussions on future investments and knowledge 
sharing/collaboration. 
The industry feedback on the government subcommittee’s 
proposed risk classification system was that it was not 
very useful. Many of the TIM attendees stated that the 
system was too similar to NASA’s traditional 
classification system and could therefore lead to 
significant constraints and burdens on a CubeSat mission. 
Many of the TIM attendees felt that by classifying a 
mission, it eliminated the flexibility needed to tailor 
mission assurance activities for specific subsystems and 
components. There was also disagreement regarding the 
number of bins needed for a CubeSat, i.e. three classes vs. 
four. Ultimately, there were two major recommendations 
regarding the subcommittee’s recommended risk 
classification system. The first recommendation was that 
a confidence-based approach is preferred over a risk-
based approach. Instead of characterizing risk, a CubeSat 
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mission should instead perform some level of assurance 
activities to achieve a threshold of confidence acceptable 
for their mission. Secondly, attendees stated that a “menu-
style” approach is preferable when determining mission 
assurance activities for a CubeSat/SmallSat. Applying a 
menu-style approach to a CubeSat mission would 
facilitate a holistic approach to mission assurance where 
requirements are tailored based on trades at the mission or 
system level. With this model, a CubeSat mission may 
decide to perform high-confidence mission assurance 
activities in certain areas and medium- or low-confidence 
activities in other areas, based on which components of 
the CubeSat are absolutely required to meet mission 
performance requirements in space.  Effectively, the 
mission would select its activities from a menu, and a 
determination of confidence-level would be made based 
on the activities performed and other contributing factors. 
Other significant findings from the TIM and its related 
splinter sessions are as follows: 
• Even in the fast-moving CubeSat market, it is 
essential to take a break between build cycles to 
capture lessons-learned and incorporate those 
lessons in the next design phase. 
• Commercial EEE parts are appropriate for CubeSat 
missions with some caveats. When using such parts, 
care should be taken to ensure good thermal, 
mechanical, and electrical design to reduce parts 
stress, as well as robust board and system level 
testing to flesh out infant mortality issues. 
• Developer should select parts with at least the 
temperature range necessary for the mission (with 
some margin), have a thermal engineer involved 
early in the process, and implement other thermal 
stress-reducing measures. 
• Missions should electrically derate part stress levels 
where possible. 
• Radiation effects can be a threat to mission success 
and must be seriously considered.  In some cases, 
radiation testing of parts may be necessary and 
developers should consider implementing processes 
where radiation tolerance is achieved through 
design. 
• In cases where higher reliability is needed for a 
particular part, developers should consider using 
automotive grade components; radiation effects still 
must be considered separately. 
• A parts database containing radiation test results and 
other failure and anomaly information would be 
very useful to the CubeSat community and should 
be furnished by government organizations. 
• The government should consider sponsoring 
radiation testing of selected CubeSat EEE parts and 
making the results available to the industry. 
• The government should consider investing in the 
creation of a FAQ website where questions about 
CubeSat/SmallSat reliability can be asked and 
answered by subject matter experts. 
• Software needs more attention and should be 
discussed in greater detail during a subsequent 
meeting. 
• Routine clean room and safe-handling practices for 
electronics and flight hardware should be posted for 
vendors and academia to learn the hard-won lessons 
of the last few decades. 
There was universal consensus that a parts database 
containing radiation test results and other failure and 
anomaly information would be very useful to the CubeSat 
community. The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) 
has nearly completed development of its Space Parts on 
Orbit Now (SPOON) database. The SPOON database 
contains reliability information on previously-procured 
CubeSat subsystems. The SPOON database is not yet 
available for all users. While everyone agreed that 
database and information sharing would be useful, there 
are also some obstacles to overcome that must be 
addressed to reach this goal. It was agreed that this type of 
data sharing will require government leadership and 
moderation. Access control, source data anonymity, and 
data format standardization are examples of some of the 
challenges that must be worked through to establish the 
type of data sharing desired by the industry. 
Success is best achieved when considering the processes 
to determine the reliability of a system. System-level 
testing processes include fully testing a system to failure, 
testing to characterize failure modes of critical 
subsystems, and methodically removing further testing of 
components that already have flight heritage. The 
participants suggested that to buy down risk and 
component-level test costs, CubeSat/SmallSat developers 
should fly new technologies on missions where that 
technology is not critical so that some flight data can be 
collected. This approach enables cyclical technology 
insertion by testing components and determining their 
failures modes when those components are not critical to 
mission success. 
A representative from Planet at this meeting described 
Planet’s success in embracing the “fly-fix-fly” approach 
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to technology insertion. Their conclusion was that on-
orbit testing provided the best results and that despite the 
fact that on-orbit failures can be difficult to accept, “if you 
just keep going, eventually you get there”. 
It is clear that there is a need for a standard list of 
questions that facilitate discussion and engender 
transparency regarding a vendor product that has changed. 
The threshold for requalification could vary depending on 
the design, heritage, pedigree, and other factors. 
Therefore, it is important to know what changes have 
been made since the last qualification, what impacts those 
changes have on the system, and whether a vendor has 
confidence that a requalification should be performed. 
TIM attendees discussed testing at the board level instead 
of the part level when a requalification is performed and 
the possibility of performing analyses in lieu of 
requalification testing. When quantifying risks associated 
with design changes the TIM attendees largely 
recommended a 5X5 risk scale that is appropriate for 
CubeSats/SmallSats. It was also recommended to focus 
on qualitative data instead of quantitative data, and factor 
in heritage and pedigree. 
A splinter topic question entitled “For each classification 
level, what is the appropriate level of testing (i.e. TVAC, 
Vibration, etc.) and what is the appropriate build and 
sparing policy” was also discussed but no firm 
conclusions were reached.  The topic was deferred to the 
next meeting. 
Much of the future investment discussion was about 
investing in data sharing. Software is another area 
requiring further discussion and future investment. 
Government-Off-the-Shelf (GOTS) Software, and 
NASA and DoD software licensing were some of the 
things discussed by the TIM attendees. It was agreed 
that software needs more attention and should be 
discussed in greater detail at the next TIM.  
In conclusion, the TIM created an atmosphere of free 
and innovative idea exchange amongst its attendees. 
The team has taken all feedback into consideration and 
will continue to meet and work on a confidence-based 
approach for the different mission assurance disciplines 
needed to address CubeSat/SmallSat reliability. These 
recommendations will be documented in a paper that 
could ultimately be used as the basis for an industry 
CubeSat standard framework.  Additional 
documentation on the TIM and findings from future 
activities can be accessed at the Small Satellite Virtual 
Institute website— https://www.nasa.gov/smallsat-
institute/reliability-initiative. 
A second CubeSat-SmallSat TIM is scheduled for 
October 2017 at NASA Headquarters. In parallel to the 
team’s efforts, communication mechanisms and 
collaboration opportunities should be thoroughly 
explored for all areas where it is advantageous to the 
community (e.g.  radiation and EEE parts database, 
failure and anomaly database, etc.). 
POST TIM: REVISITING RELIABILITY 
APPROACHES FOR CUBESATS/SMALLSATS 
Small satellite missions can generally be broken into 
higher-level (mission and system) and lower-level 
(component and subsystem) architectural elements. 
Depending on how these elements are combined and 
operated to accomplish the mission, reliability at one 
level may or may not relate directly to reliability at 
another level.  For example, very reliable components 
(such as reaction wheels or radiation-tolerant piece-
parts) don’t guarantee reliability at the mission level if 
those elements are combined into an architecture with 
inherent flaws (undersized reaction wheels for 
maneuver control or electronics requiring more power 
than the vehicle can provide while maintaining the 
needed operational duty cycle). Missions involving 
constellations of satellites, for example, may be able to 
achieve overall high mission reliability even when 
individual vehicle or component reliability is not high. 
The breadth of potential missions, mission objectives, 
and architectures indicate that a “one-size-fits-all” 
approach to reliability is not likely to be efficient. A 
flexible approach to framing solutions for a particular 
mission is a more optimal approach. 
For the next TIM, the team envisages proposing a 
spectrum of criteria and capabilities for both high-level 
(mission/system) and lower-level 
(component/subsystem) views of the mission, for which 
potential approaches to improve reliability are 
identified.  The resulting matrices could provide a 
framework that the mission development teams can use 
to focus their critical needs and development areas, and 
then prioritize activities or design choices to make more 
effective plans for their particular mission.  To 
illustrate, a few examples are provided below, and then 
explored further by walking through the possible 
selections two different missions might make.
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At the Mission and System level, one can generally describe a variety of characteristics such as space environment 
(LEO, GTO, Deep Space) and configuration (single vehicle, constellation, mother/daughtership), and map these to a 
spectrum of mission criticality or potential reliability needs (national security critical need; operational mission; gap-
filler; technology demonstration).  These elements combined can help focus the overall reliability needs for the 
mission.  Some LEO missions, for example, may have relatively frequent and inexpensive launch opportunities 
when compared to certain deep space missions, thus enabling an overall higher risk tolerance.  Constellations may 
have overall higher risk tolerance for individual workmanship issues that may lead to individual vehicle failures, but 
very low risk tolerance for common failure modes that could cause the entire constellation to fail.  A representative 
snapshot of this idea is provided in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: A representative spectrum of risk tolerance as a function of the mission criticality and 
implementation approach 
Any particular mission concept is likely to map to multiple places on the risk tolerance spectrum depending on 
specific mission characteristic under consideration.  For example, a notional mapping of a military mission could 
look like that in Table 2, and of a science instrument technology demonstration like that in Table 3. 
Risk Tolerance → 
Mission 
Characteristics ↓ 
Very Low Low Moderate High Very High 
Mission Criticality National Security; 
Operational 
Operational; 
Primary Science 
Gap Filler Experimental; 
Technology Demo 
Technology Demo; 
Teaching System 
LEO Mission Life 5+ years 3-5 years ~1 year Months Days to weeks 
Deep Space Mission 
Life 
10+ years 5+ years 1-3 years Months Days 
Single Satellite Operational 
Mission 
Data gathering Gap Filler Experiment Technology 
Demonstration 
Constellation (>10) 
Satellites 
Common mode 
failures ruled out 
High unit cost; 
limited “spare” 
vehicles 
 Multiple spare 
vehicles 
Re-launch readily 
available 
Flight Development 
Time 
>5 years  ~ 2 years  <12 months 
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Table 2: Mission characteristic risk tolerance for a hypothetical military mission 
Risk Tolerance → 
Mission 
Characteristics ↓ 
Very Low Low Moderate High Very High 
Mission Criticality National 
Security; 
Operational 
Operational; 
Primary Science 
Gap Filler Experimental; 
Technology 
Demonstration 
Technology 
Demonstration; 
Teaching System 
LEO Mission Life 5+ years 3-5 years ~1 year Months Days to weeks 
Deep Space Mission 
Life 
10+ years 5+ years 1-3 years Months Days 
Single Satellite Operational 
Mission 
Data gathering Gap Filler Experiment Technology 
Demonstration 
Constellation (>10) 
Satellites 
Common mode 
failures ruled out 
High unit cost; 
limited “spare” 
vehicles 
 Multiple spare 
vehicles 
Re-launch readily 
available 
Flight System 
Development Time 
>5 years  ~ 2 years  <12 months 
 
Table 3: Mission characteristic risk tolerance for a hypothetical science instrument technology demonstration 
mission 
Risk Tolerance → 
Mission 
Characteristics ↓ 
Very Low Low Moderate High Very High 
Mission Criticality National 
Security; 
Operational 
Operational; 
Primary Science 
Gap Filler Experimental; 
Technology 
Demonstration 
Technology 
Demonstration; 
Teaching System 
LEO Mission Life 5+ years 3-5 years ~1 year Months Days to weeks 
Deep Space Mission 
Life 
10+ years 5+ years 1-3 years Months Days 
Single Satellite Operational 
Mission 
Data gathering Gap Filler Experiment Technology 
Demonstration 
Constellation (>10) 
Satellites 
Common mode 
failures ruled out 
High unit cost; 
limited “spare” 
vehicles 
 Multiple spare 
vehicles 
Re-launch readily 
available 
Flight System 
Development Time 
>5 years 48 months ~ 2 years  <12 months 
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It is interesting to note that for these two hypothetical systems, the risk tolerance for the military mission covers the 
entire spectrum, depending on mission characteristics, while that for the science mission is heavily weighted towards 
a low-risk tolerance.  These examples are provided to show that the implementation approach at the Component/ 
Subsystem level can vary widely, depending on how those elements map back to the mission characteristics.   While 
mission criticality demands very low-risk tolerance for most military missions, the rapid system development time 
suggests that it may be appropriate to accept high risk in certain development areas. 
At the Component/Subsystem level, the suggested approach is to develop a set of guidelines based on community 
best practices and heuristic data (when available) to guide prioritization of activities and processes to achieve the 
desired overall mission reliability. Items to be addressed can span the entire project lifecycle and include 
management approaches, design and analysis methodology, documentation and testing. As part of the SSRI, a 
preliminary set of items and associated lessons-learned are being compiled. A representative sample is shown in 
Table 4.  The objective is to develop a guideline document with the vendors, updated when new data become 
available, to provide an effective planning and communication tool for mission development teams to identify their 
most critical areas and prioritize which activities or processes to pursue for the most cost- (or schedule-) effective 
solution for their mission. 
Table 4: Potential examples of best practices to achieve desired specific reliability 
FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS 
The workshop has identified two critical elements that 
couldn’t be resolved during the workshop. Many of the 
CubeSat providers felt that they have valuable 
experience in building reliable spacecraft and advocated 
to assume more of the development and assurance risk. 
Further, communicating the proper risk posture for 
SmallSats and CubeSats couldn’t be achieved by 
merely adopting the NASA risk classes as defined in 
NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 8705.4 (Risk 
Classification Guidelines for NASA Payloads) for 
missions governed by NPR 7120.5 (NASA Space Flight 
Program and Project Management Requirements), as 
the missions had requirements that were too diverse to 
fit the large application and risk spectrum. The 
consolidated community realized that it is possible to 
negotiate a risk posture and determine who is carrying 
the risk as long as all contributing risk elements are 
disclosed, all assumptions are identified, and a logical 
construct is built to prove that all listed risk elements 
and assumptions will completely describe the final 
system.  
Such an approach can be derived from the concept of a 
“Safety Case.”  A Safety Case is a structured argument, 
supported by evidence, intended to justify that a system 
is acceptably safe for a specific application in a specific 
operating environment.1 Developed over several 
decades in the UK, they are in widespread use in 
Europe and elsewhere as the means to organize and 
present the rigorous argument for the adequate safety of 
Risk Tolerance → 
Activity or Process ↓ 
Lower Risk Tolerance ←  → Higher Risk Tolerance 
Reviews Formal SRR, PDR and CDR with 
external review board 
←  → Internal informal reviews with key stakeholders 
Drawings Configuration managed drawings / 
CAD models with critical review 
and signoff 
←  → Capture as-built configuration and key dimensions. 
Rudimentary CAD model recommended. 
EEE Parts Rad-hard or rad-tolerant parts in 
critical areas 
←  → COTS parts; keep records of as-built 
Thermal Cycling Cycling at board, box, and full 
vehicle level 
←  → At least four cycles at full vehicle level recommended 
Environmental Test Qual unit to validate design and 
Acceptance testing to validate 
workmanship 
←  → As required by launch provider 
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major industrial installations (e.g., transportation 
systems, chemical plants, oil platforms, nuclear plants, 
weapons systems). 
The need for sophisticated systems approaches 
highlights the contradictions and challenges that 
CubeSats and SmallSats present.  The rapid advances in 
the capability of commercial electronics and modern 
highly-optimized manufacturing processes result in 
highly-integrated and engineered systems being made 
available to mass markets with a concomitant decrease 
in cost.  Such a decrease in overall space flight costs are 
only now beginning to be realized but this presents 
unique challenges coupled with the extreme and often 
unforgiving environmental conditions that space flight 
operations entail.  Inexpensive electronics do not imply 
an inexpensive or possibly limited rigorous approach to 
risk mitigation and assurance.  It should be noted that 
the interdependencies and system interactions, 
requirements, and overall complexity of spacecraft 
operation regardless of physical size, demand a sensible 
risk approach.  Leveraging modern simulation and 
analytical tools developed for other similarly complex 
and often high financial risk industries is a logical and 
reasonable approach that can quickly provide ‘value 
added’ robustness to the overall decision and review 
processes for CubeSat/SmallSat missions. 
Miniaturized satellite systems pose an additional 
challenge—not only is the system tied to unique 
operational and environmental constraints, but much of 
the contributing component testing data does not exist. 
Therefore, tracing requirements directly to system 
performance from the design through operational 
testing is extremely difficult due to the large operational 
space that precludes exhaustive testing for the cost 
envelopes of these missions. 
Formal Assurance Cases, such as those provided 
through the use of the Goal Structuring Notation 
(GSN), provide the framework to do this. We see them 
being used elsewhere to assure the safety of UAVs, a 
burgeoning use of autonomy in a terrestrial arena.2  
Since the workshop concluded, members of the 
reliability team have taken the challenge of adapting the 
use of assurance cases to a test case of a SmallSat space 
mission and developed the construct prior to the 
contract award. It is expected that this will make will 
make it possible to clearly identify mission risk drivers 
and lay the foundation to negotiate risk. 
This initiative is an ongoing process, whereby we hope 
to come to an approach acceptable to all participants. 
Along with the upcoming 2nd TIM in October, there is a 
Mission Assurance Improvement Workshop (MAIW) to 
explore and document best practices and craft a 
common approach to mission assurance for the U.S. 
space program. The MAIW is a community of practice 
dedicated to the development and promulgation of 
proven scientific, engineering, quality, and program 
management practices related to the U.S. space 
program's mission success.3  
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